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GATEway to the Cloud 
Case study: A privacy-aware environment for Electronic Health Records research 
Rob Smith, Professor Jie Xu, Saman Hima & Dr. Owen Johnson, School of Computing, University of Leeds, Leeds, 
UK 
 
We describe a study in the domain of health informatics which 
includes some novel requirements for patient confidentiality in the 
context of medical health research. We present a prototype which 
takes health records from a commercial data provider, anonymises 
them in an innovative way and makes them available within a 
secure cloud-based Virtual Research Environment (VRE). Data 
anonymity is tailored as required for individual researchers’ needs 
and ethics committee approval. VREs are dynamically configured 
to model each researcher’s personal research environment while 
maintaining data integrity, provenance generation and patient 
confidentiality. 
Keywords— privacy; health informatics; virtual research 
environment; anonymity; natural language processing 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Several branches of medical research focus on the study of 
patient health records.  These records are generated by patient 
interactions with health professionals including but not 
restricted to General Practitioners (GPs) and Nurse 
Practitioners, nurses, hospital doctors and specialists.   
 
Health records are a rich source of research data because they 
contain information related directly to illnesses alongside 
information providing potential context, such as lifestyle, risk 
factors and family history. Health records are usually 
documented as coded information (codes referring to 
conditions, medicines, interventions etc.) and unstructured free 
text.    
 
In reality, practitioners do not always use codes when they 
ought to and do not always use them correctly, so much of the 
information available to research is hidden within free text. 
The type of information found in free text fields varies greatly: 
it depends on the details of discussions between patients and 
medical practitioners; the individual habits of those 
practitioners; and on what is considered relevant in the context 
of a particular consultation.  As a result, health records are 
likely to contain a great deal of personal information about 
patients [1].  
 
This might include data the patient did not expect to be 
recorded and data about other people, such as family 
members, who have not given permission for the storage or 
sharing of their data. Crucially, it might contain information 
which would allow the patient to be identified. 
 
Some data recorded in health records is obviously personal 
(for example, names, locations, professions) whereas some is 
more subtly personal (such as natural language descriptions of 
relationships, activities etc.) [2] 
 
It is a duty of those who provide researchers with health 
record data to ensure that the personal privacy (and especially 
the confidentiality) of patients is protected [3]. However, 
personal information is often important to researchers as it 
contextualises interventions. Such context information is often 
the reason researchers require access to health records in the 
first place. For example, family history and lifestyle might be 
used to identify statistical risk factors or relative effectiveness 
of interventions. 
 
This type of correlation might be gleaned from analysis of 
records en masse but there are two problems of particular 
concern: 
 
1. It is difficult to obtain such information from free text 
[4], and 
 
2. Doing so might violate the privacy of patients and 
other individuals mentioned in the patient’s records 
[5]. 
 
The challenge is to make available the information researchers 
need without violating the privacy of the patients who own 
that data.  To achieve this goal, the JISC GATEway to the 
Clouds project has built a prototype of a cloud-based Virtual 
Research Environment (VRE).   
 
VREs are self-contained environments which are preloaded 
with the data appropriate to the research to be conducted by 
individual researchers. A VRE can replicate a researcher’s 
familiar personal research environment by incorporating their 
habitual tools and other data sources. This means that 
researchers can conduct experiments within their VRE rather 
than having to download the data and take them elsewhere, 
which constitutes a privacy risk.  The project has also 
developed a process for using natural language processing 
(NLP) to deliver data into VREs at customisable levels of 
anonymity corresponding to individual researchers' needs and 
ethics committee approval.   
II. BACKGROUND 
The case study centres on a longstanding collaboration 
between Leeds University and The Phoenix Partnership (TPP).  
TPP has developed a clinical information system, SystmOne, 
which connects different healthcare organisations.  SystmOne 
provides a single interface for medical professionals to access 
and update patient data throughout that patient's lifetime of 
care.   
 
With SystmOne, details of every appointment, medication, 
illness, allergy and contact a patient has ever had can be 
documented in a single location and made available to 
healthcare professionals within the context of a health 
consultation or intervention.  It is a hosted solution, so data 
can be shared securely between a range of healthcare settings 
including GPs, child health, urgent care, palliative care, 
hospitals, mental health and social care with the emphasis on 
'one patient, one record'. 
  
TPP therefore has great deal of patient health data recorded by 
health professionals including approximately 23.5m patient 
records from 16m GP-registered patients. The dataset covers 
the social, primary and secondary NHS Electronic Health 
Records of a representative coverage of patients in England.  
 
This data is very attractive to medical researchers and TPP has 
a longstanding collaboration with Leeds University within 
which it can share anonymised data under appropriate ethics 
committee approval.  Ethics approval is a vital but time-
consuming and often frustrating process, usually taking 
months to arrange. 
  
Another issue is that approved anonymised health records are 
often delivered to researchers by insecure methods such as 
disk or email.  Researchers import the data into their own 
research environment and are responsible for its security 
thereafter.  This approach can lead to privacy problems.  There 
are well-known examples [6] of large volumes of personal 
data being mistakenly left in public places when media or 
laptops are stolen or mislaid.   
 
Similarly, it is unreasonable to assume in general that the 
environments in which the data are housed are adequately 
secure or that the data will not be misused [7]. 
  
A final problem is that anonymisation is an expensive, time-
consuming and error-prone process [8]. There are two aspects 
to this: first, it cannot easily be guaranteed that all personal 
information is removed from a large volume of data during the 
anonymisation process; and second, it cannot be guaranteed 
that information vital to a particular research endeavour is not 
accidentally removed.  
  
The JISC project GATEway to the Cloud has built a prototype 
solution to address some of these issues. On-going activity at 
Leeds University aims to develop an industrially-robust 
production system based on that prototype.   
 
The remainder of this paper will describe the GATEway 
prototype and the novel privacy issues surrounding it. 
III.  VRE REQUIREMENTS 
The case study determined several novel requirements for 
deploying Virtual Research Environments to conduct health 
records research. 
 
A guiding principle for a VRE in this instance is that it should 
resemble individual researchers' normal working 
environments as closely as possible.  This means that it must 
be able to accommodate the tools and data the researcher 
would ordinarily use to conduct their research.  It should be 
possible for standard tools to be pre-installed into VREs and 
managed by VRE administrators and for other tools to be 
installed and managed by users. Different OS options and 
versions should be available and customisable by 
administrators and researchers. 
 
A VRE should contain the data a researcher is entitled to at an 
appropriate level of anonymisation. This should be 
customisable to individual researchers’ needs: for example, 
some research endeavours require location, family or 
historical information, whereas others are concerned solely 
with treatments prescribed for certain conditions. 
 
VREs and the workflows used to manage their lifecycles must 
be subject to audit. The audit trail should generate provenance 
related to the research processes and output. Provenance data 
can aid in the replication and verification of experimental 
results and the resolution of disputes about privacy. For 
example, it should always be possible to determine the 
specific dataset, level of anonymity and researchers involved 
in generating a particular set of results. 
 
The computing resources available to a VRE should be 
dynamically customisable according to researchers’ needs. If a 
researcher’s environment is limited by resource, she is likely 
to remove patient data from the VRE and relocate it into an 
ungoverned environment, creating privacy risks. 
 
Access to a VRE should be customisable to specific 
researchers' needs and ethics committee requirements. In some 
cases, data might be accessed only from a specific machine or 
from within a specific network (or VPN) or organisation. In 
others, it might be accessible over the Internet.  The ultimate 
goal is that the system be sufficiently trustworthy that data 
providers and ethics committees agree that Internet access be 
the norm, but in the meantime, flexibility is vital.   
 
The protection of patient privacy - and especially 
confidentiality - is paramount.  In practice, this must place 
privacy management largely in the hands of patients 
themselves, who must be able to decide how and under what 
circumstances their records may be used.  It also requires that 
management of privacy becomes a joint, co-built activity 
involving patients, medical practitioners, medical data 
providers and VRE administrators. 
   
Some of these requirements are novel.  For example, the 
concept of fine-grained customisation of anonymity levels, 
generated automatically by NLP as part of a mutually-
managed research pipeline has not yet been attempted.  
Likewise, the idea of the co-management of privacy as an 
integral part of the research environment lifecycle alongside 
provenance has not been fully addressed.  
IV. PRIVACY 
The principal privacy concern in this domain is patient 
confidentiality [9, 10, 11].  This is achieved partly through 
anonymity and partly through the principles of notice and 
consent.  
A. Anonymity 
Records in a VRE are anonymised.  This is the first line of 
protection for patients.  Anonymisation means that a record 
should not contain personal information such as proper names.   
 
Part of the anonymisation process is straightforward: remove 
personalised information from the name fields in the patient 
record.  However, names also appear in free text fields within 
the record.  For example, a GP might refer to the patient by 
name while discussing an appointment ("Mrs Hussain 
complained of migraine…") While humans are adept at 
identifying names within free text, it is time-consuming and 
error-prone.  Given the volume of data involved, natural 
language processing (NLP) of free text data must be 
employed.   
 
The problem is complex. For example, it is not always 
obvious what constitutes a person's name. Look-up tables of 
names are useful but not adequate since unusual names might 
be missed, names might be misspelled or used in unusual 
configurations. There is also the possibility of false positives, 
since many names are derived from place names, professions 
etc. (for example, Windsor can be either a surname or a place 
name; Smith can be a surname or a profession). If done 
without care, this can lead to important contextual information 
being identified as a name and erroneously removed from a 
VRE's dataset.  For these reasons, a complex set of NLP rules 
is required to identify even the simplest and most direct 
personal information. 
  
The removal of personal information from patient records is 
more complex still.  For example, consider the following as 
part of a free text field compiled by a GP: 
  
Ms Hutchinson's father, Allen, aged 82 
was admitted to the Royal Victoria 
Infirmary in July 2009 suffering from 
heart disease. 
  
There are four potential privacy issues for patients: 
  
1. Ms Hutchinson is mentioned by name and is 
therefore identifiable. 
 
2. Even if her name were removed, Ms Hutchinson 
might be identified from the information about her 
father. 
 
3. It might be possible to make inferences about Ms 
Hutchinson's health based on her father's medical 
history. 
 
4. The record contains personal information about Ms 
Hutchinson's father, who has likely not given 
permission for it to be shared. 
  
The anonymisation process must be able to cope with 
scenarios such as this, which is why complex, context-
dependent and domain-specific NLP is required. 
 
B. Levels of anonymity 
Different medical research scenarios require different views of 
the same dataset. Personal information can contextualise data 
and fully anonymised records might not be suitable for some 
purposes.  In the example of Ms Hutchinson above, her 
father's medical history might be medically relevant for some 
studies, but not others. As a matter of privacy principle, 
researchers should not be granted access to identifiable data 
they do not need and do not have ethics approval to use.  
 
For this reason, different levels of anonymity are required, 
each with a different set of potentially identifiable data 
elements. To achieve this, natural language processing is used 
to tag data according to contextually relevant factors and 
certain tagged information redacted for particular researchers 
according to an anonymisation schema. 
  
By providing different levels of anonymity according to 
individual researchers' needs, we can protect the 
confidentiality of patients on an individual basis and 
potentially streamline the process of gaining ethics committee 
approval.  
V. CONSENT AND NOTICE 
Consent and notice are important principles for privacy 
preservation [12].  Consent requires that data owners have 
some meaningful choice over how their data is shared and 
used.  Notice requires a mechanism with which users can 
extract information about how their data has been used and 
about any relevant changes in privacy policies.  Within this 
application, consent and notice equate to the following:  
A. Consent  
Patients must be able to opt in or out of participation in 
medical research depending on the details of local legislation. 
Patients should be able to choose what types of medical 
research their records can be used for (for example, some 
patients might wish to prevent their data from being used in 
research that involves experimentation on animals). 
 
Patients must be able to choose a maximum level of 
information that they are prepared to share for the purposes of 
certain types of medical research.  For example, they might 
not wish to share family history in trials that involve mental 
health medicine.  
B. Notice 
It must be possible for patients to determine when their 
records have been used, by whom and for what purpose. They 
must be able to find out detailed information about the 
projects their data has been used in. 
 
Patients must be informed if there are changes to the policies 
governing their requirements and should be informed about 
how the governance has changed. They should be able to 
modify their privacy requirements accordingly. For example, 
if privacy policies or anonymisation schemas change, patients 
should be informed so that they can modify their consent. 
C. Ethics 
One of the purposes of the GATEWay project was to work 
toward streamlining the process of ethics committee approval 
for research projects. This might be achieved by combining a 
secure environment for conducting research with levels of 
anonymity controlled by anonymity schema.  The idea is that 
anonymity schemas represent standard uses of data and once a 
project employing a schema has been approved, it should be 
easier to gain approval for other projects using the same 
schema. Conversely, individuals must be able to determine 
how their data has been shared and used.   
VI. NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING AND 
ANONYMISATION SCHEMA 
In the medical domain, data sets contain protected health 
information (PHI) that can identify individuals. 
Anonymisation is the removal of PHI, which is a 2-step 
process: 
 
1. Identification of PHI and its classification with PHI 
categories. 
2. Anonymisation of identified PHIs by replacing them with 
their respective PHI categories. 
   
The data used in this research contain 2534 PHIs which are 
classified into following PHI categories: Patient Name; Doctor 
Name; Place Name; Other Name; and Risky Behaviour. 
 
For example, consider the following excerpt from a medical 
record: 
 
Mrs Ward has health risks due to 
excessive alcohol consumption. Her 
husband, Derek Ward, may be at risk too. 
 
In this example, “Derek Ward” should be identified as PHI 
and classified as 'Other Name'. This is achieved by specifying 
rules using the NLP software GATE (http://gate.ac.uk/). The 
rule for identifying “husband, Derek Ward” in this case is as 
follows: 
 
Rule:OtherNames 
( 
    ( 
    {Lookup.majorType == other} 
 // Dictionary of relations, roles, 
occupations 
    {Token.kind==punctuation} 
    (SPACE) 
    (NAME)    //'NAME' is 
Macro rule for identifying proper names  
    (SPACE) 
    (NAME) 
    ) 
) 
:label 
--> 
:label.OtherName={Rule=OtherNames} 
 
This record will be tagged as XML as follows; 
 
<patientname>Mrs Ward</patientname> has 
health risks due to <risky 
behaviour>excessive alcohol 
consumption</riskybehaviour>. Her 
<othername>husband, Derek 
Ward</othername>, may be at risk too.  
  
This tagging reveals important semantic data that might 
otherwise remain hidden within free text in a health record.   
 
After the identification and classification of PHIs, the 
anonymisation is completed by replacing identified PHIs with 
their respective PHIcategories (XML tags) according to an 
anonymisation schema such as the following: 
 
{-patientname 
+riskybehaviour 
-othername} 
 
Resulting in a record with the data contained within the tags 
redacted, indicating that an anonymous patient has health risks 
due to excessive alcohol consumption and that another - 
unknown - person might also be at risk: 
 
Patient has health risks due to excessive 
alcohol consumption. Other Person may be 
at risk too. 
 
Other schemas will represent different research objectives and 
different risks.  
 
The NLP tagging and redaction based on anonymisation 
schema help ensure that as much semantic information as 
required can be easily recovered, even from free text fields, 
but that information a researcher is not entitled to will be 
removed.  
VII. THE PROTOTYPE 
The GATEway project developed a prototype of the VRE and 
the data anonymisation process.   
A. The data anonymisation pipeline 
 
 
Figure 1: the pipleline from raw data to anonymised data in a 
researcher’s VRE 
 
1. A researcher requests data from a data provider, 
specifying needs and the use to which the data will be 
put. 
 
2. The data provider prepares the data set and an 
anonymisation schema and uploads the data to the 
VRE. 
 
3. The NLP module tags the data and uses the 
anonymisation schema to remove any tagged data the 
researcher is not entitled to see. 
 
4. A VRE administrator performs a risk assessment on 
the anonymised data, examining it for personal 
information that has been missed by NLP and 
identifying possible false positives. 
 
5. The VRE administrator negotiates with the researcher 
over VM requirements including what operating 
systems, applications and resources are needed. 
 
6. The VRE administrator creates a VM for that 
researcher (or modifies an existing one) and uploads 
the validated dataset into it. 
 
7. The researcher customises her VM if necessary by 
uploading tools and additional data, then can begin to 
conduct research. 
 
The data provider is responsible for creating datasets and 
anonymisation schemas for researchers. VRE Administrators 
are responsible for the anonymisation of datasets, the creation 
and management of VMs and the assignment of validated 
anonymous datasets to particular VMs. 
 
We have developed a module for the GATE  
 
VIII. VRE ARCHITECTURE 
The VRE is built according to the following (high-level) 
architecture: 
 
 
 
Figure 2: VRE architecture 
 
A. Virtual machines 
Each researchers or group of researchers is assigned a VM 
which contains the data and tools they need to conduct their 
research. The resources available to a VM are dynamically 
customisable and reclocatable, hosted on a private cloud. 
 
B. User interface 
Researchers connect to their VMs via either a browser or 
Remote Desktop connection. The browser interface is 
restricted but customisable: researchers can run common 
queries on data, build their own queries, import tools into the 
environment and dynamically change resource allocations. 
The Remote Desktop interface gives full access to the VM 
(according to access control) for more complex tasks. 
C. Data upload 
The data pipeline is discussed in the previous section. The 
Data Upload module is used by data providers to submit data 
from their clinical information systems.  The NLP module 
takes raw datasets and produces semantically tagged datasets. 
 
The Anonymiser takes tagged datasets and removes 
information according to the associated anonymisation 
schema.  The Data Validation module enable enables risk 
assessment of anonymous datasets and manages their upload 
to the appropriate VMS. 
D. Audit 
The audit module records the creation and assignment of 
users, VMs, anonymisation schema and datasets to provide a 
record of what data is accessible under what circumstances to 
which researchers. 
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The case study describes some novel requirements which arise 
from the increased ubiquity and availability of data associated 
with changing attitudes to data collection, management and 
use; increased ability to index, process and visualise data; and 
increasing public awareness of the need to protect one’s own 
privacy (and particularly in this case, confidentiality). 
 
We have built a prototype to demonstrate proof of concept of 
many of these ideas. However, it does not address all the 
requirements of privacy in this environment. For example, it 
does not fully implement the issues of consent and notice. 
Consent might be implemented through an additional layer of 
privacy policy and related protocols. In this scenario, patient 
privacy policies could be matched with anonymity schema to 
ensure that only patients who opt in to (or do not opt-out of) 
the conditions of a schema are included in particular datasets. 
This is the subject of on-going research. We anticipate that 
audit be expanded to include provenance generation to aid 
replication and validation of experiments as well as the 
policing privacy. 
 
Notice could be implemented using notification or syndication 
generated by events in the audit module in conjunction with 
appropriate protocols and anonymity schema to inform 
patients about the use of their data or changes in policies. This 
is also a subject of on-going research.  
 
We are currently working to expand the prototype beyond 
proof of concept to a production-ready environment in 
conjunction with Leeds Information Systems and Services 
department and our industrial partners.  This will involve 
migrating the service from the private cloud to the White Rose 
Grid, which is a large-scale computing resource shared by the 
universities of Leeds, York and Sheffield.  We also plan to 
extend the service to data providers other than TPP and to 
applications other than health records research. 
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